Bar-Isaac, Heski and Gavazza, Alessandro 
ORCID: 0000-0001-9236-5813
(2013)
Brokers' contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market.
Rotman School of Management working paper (2205157).
Social Sciences Research Network for Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Abstract
We use new data from a rental brokers' multiple listings service to examine the contractual agreements between landlords and brokers. The data display two sources of variation in the way in which agents are compensated: 1) 69 percent of listings involve exclusive relationships between landlords and agents (the other 31 percent are non-exclusive); and 2) in 23 percent of listings, landlords commit to pay the agent's fee (in the other 77 percent, the agent collects the fee from the tenant). We show that contracts vary according to apartment characteristics and market conditions. Specifically, landlords are more likely to sign exclusive agreements with agents for more-atypical apartments and are more likely to pay brokers' fees when apartments are in rent-stabilized buildings and when local vacancy rates are higher.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.ssrn.com/en/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2013 The Author(s) © 2013 Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto |
| Divisions: | Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HF Commerce |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Feb 2014 16:46 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Apr 2024 07:58 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/55728 |
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