Hawthorne, John and Bovens, Luc (1999) The preface, the lottery, and the logic of belief. Mind, 108 (430). pp. 241-264. ISSN 0026-4423
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
John Locke proposed a straightforward relationship between qualitative and quantitative doxastic notions: belief corresponds to a sufficiently high degree of confidence. Richard Foley has further developed this Lockean thesis and applied it to an analysis of the preface and lottery paradoxes. Following Foley's lead, we exploit various versions of these paradoxes to chart a precise relationship between belief and probabilistic degrees of confidence. The resolutions of these paradoxes emphasize distinct but complementary features of coherent belief. These features suggest principles that tie together qualitative and quantitative doxastic notions. We show how these principles may be employed to construct a quantitative model - in terms of degrees of confidence - of an agent's qualitative doxastic state. This analysis fleshes out the Lockean thesis and provides the foundation for a logic of belief that is responsive to the logic of degrees of confidence
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 1999 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Dec 2013 08:59 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 21:13 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/54963 |
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