Caselli, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0001-5191-7156, Cunningham, Tom, Morelli, Massimo and de Barreda, Inés Moreno (2014) The incumbency effects of signalling. Economica, 81 (323). pp. 397-418. ISSN 0013-0427
|
PDF
- Accepted Version
Download (753kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re-election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a re-election hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for re-election. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Official URL: | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(IS... |
Additional Information: | © 2013 The London School of Economics and Political Science |
Divisions: | Economics Centre for Economic Performance |
Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
Date Deposited: | 02 Dec 2013 08:49 |
Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2024 00:35 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/54744 |
Actions (login required)
View Item |