Rabinowicz, Wlodek (2000) Preference stability and substitution of indifferents: a rejoinder to Seidenfeld. Theory and Decision, 48 (4). pp. 311-318. ISSN 0040-5833
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [1988a], Decision theory without 'Independence' or without 'Ordering', Economics and Philosophy 4: 267-290) gave an argument for Independence based on a supposition that admissibility of a sequential option is preserved under substitution of indifferents at choice nodes (S). To avoid a natural complaint that (S) begs the question against a critic of Independence, he provided an independent proof of (S) in his (Seidenfeld, T. [1988b], Rejoinder [to Hammond and McClennen], Economics and Philosophy 4: 309-315). In reply to my (Rabinowicz, W. [1995], To have one's cake and eat it too: Sequential choice and expected-utility violations, The Journal of Philosophy 92: 586-620), in which I argue that the proof is invalid, Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [2000], Substitution of indifferent options at choice nodes and admissibility: A reply to Rabinowicz, Theory and Decision 48: 305–310 this issue) submits that I fail to give due consideration to one of the underlying assumptions of his derivation: it is meant to apply only to those cases in which the agent's preferences are stable throughout the sequential decision process. The purpose of this note is to clarify the notion of preference stability so as meet this objection.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/... |
Additional Information: | © 2000 Springer, Part of Springer Science+Business Media |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Date Deposited: | 19 Nov 2013 14:41 |
Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 21:19 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/54446 |
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