Calvin's reformation in Geneva: self and social signalling

Levy, Gilat ORCID: 0009-0006-7641-1668 and Razin, Ronny ORCID: 0009-0009-5169-0180 (2013) Calvin's reformation in Geneva: self and social signalling. . London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

As Weber (1904) recognized, Calvinistic beliefs about predestination may constitute a powerful incentive for good works; an individual wishes to receive assurances about her future prospects of salvation, and good works may provide a positive signal about such prospects. These beliefs can in turn create a social pressure to behave well, as good works can also signal to others that individuals belong to the “elect” and are therefore likely to behave well in social interactions. Moreover, the Consistory, an institution created by Calvin to monitor and publicize individuals’ behaviour, can allow for such social signalling. We analyze these self and social signalling incentives, and show how religions affect levels of cooperation and coordination.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Additional Information:	© 2013 The Authors
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BL Religion H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology > Z12 - Religion
Date Deposited:	11 Nov 2013 14:35
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 19:11
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/54256

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