Bandiera, Oriana and Levy, Gilat (2004) Robin Hood’s compromise : the economics of moderate land reforms. Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy, 3 (1). Article 19. ISSN 1538-0645
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Abstract
This paper analyses the consequences of an unusual type of land redistribution; we take land from the very rich, as usual, but give it to the rich instead of the poor. We show that such “moderate” reform reduces agency costs and thereby increases productivity, total surplus in the economy, and the welfare of rural workers. Compared to the classic redistribution ”to the tiller”, moderate reforms do worse in terms of equity and do not give the poor a collaterizable asset. They can however do equally well in terms of efficiency and might be more sustainable both financially and politically.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Official URL: | http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2004 Berkeley Electronic Press |
| Divisions: | STICERD Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Dec 2005 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Jan 2024 03:00 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/542 |
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