Volckart, Oliver 
ORCID: 0000-0001-7330-111X
(2004)
The economics of feuding in late medieval Germany.
Explorations in Economic History, 41 (3).
pp. 282-299.
ISSN 0014-4983
Abstract
I examine the problem of contracting over time and space in late medieval Germany, where there was nothing like a modern state with a territorial monopoly of force. As a law merchant that could be used to enforce compliance did not exist either, the threat of resorting to a feud helped actors credibly to commit to contracts. The article analyzes which institutions restricted feuding and why these rules were generally respected, examines the calculus which led to the decision to declare a feud, and explains how this helped to realize gains from exchange.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.journals.elsevier.com/explorations-in-e... |
| Additional Information: | © 2003 Elsevier Inc. |
| Divisions: | Economic History |
| Subjects: | D History General and Old World > D History (General) > D111 Medieval History D History General and Old World > DD Germany H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Nov 2013 16:43 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Nov 2024 05:16 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/53912 |
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