Levy, Gilat 
ORCID: 0009-0006-7641-1668
(2003)
Careerist judges.
.
Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
Abstract
In this Paper I analyse how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations, as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court’s decision reveals whether the judge interpreted properly the law and allows the evaluator to assess the judge’s ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends on the judge’s decision. I find that judges with career concerns tend to inefficiently contradict previous decisions. I also show that such judges behave more efficiently when elected by the public than when appointed by fellow superior judges.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.cepr.org |
| Additional Information: | © 2003 Gilat Levy |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory K Law > K Law (General) |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Jun 2008 08:33 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2024 04:03 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5377 |
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