Bandiera, Oriana 
ORCID: 0009-0002-6817-793X and Levy, Gilat ORCID: 0009-0006-7641-1668
(2004)
Robin Hood's compromise: land reforms, inequality, redistribution and moral hazard.
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
Abstract
This Paper analyses an unusually conservative type of redistribution. We take land from the very rich, as usual, but give it to the rich instead of the poor. We show that this type of reform reduces agency costs, thus increasing productivity, total surplus in the economy, and workers’ welfare. Compared to the classic redistribution ‘to the tiller’ it does worse in terms of equity and does not give the poor a collaterizable asset but it is likely to be more sustainable, both economically and politically.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.cepr.org |
| Additional Information: | © 2004 Oriana Bandiera and Gilat Levy |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D - Microeconomics > D3 - Distribution > D30 - General |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Jun 2008 08:21 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Nov 2024 04:51 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5376 |
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