Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (1998) Revenue efficiency and change of control: the case of bankruptcy. CEPR Discussion Paper (2030). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails a change of control. By efficiency of a bankruptcy procedure it is usually meant that the control is allocated into the hands of those who can maximize its value. In this paper we focus instead on how to allocate control with a procedure that allows the creditors to maximize their returns. The conclusion is that creditors should be allowed to retain a fraction of the shares of the company.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.cepr.org |
| Additional Information: | © 1998 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Financial Markets Group Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D44 - Auctions G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Jun 2008 15:15 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 18:25 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5354 |
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