Scharpf, Fritz W. (2011) Monetary union, fiscal crisis and the preemption of democracy. LSE 'Europe in Question' discussion paper series (36/2011). London School of Economics and Political Science, London.
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Abstract
The European Monetary Union (EMU) has removed crucial instruments of macroeconomic management from the control of democratically accountable governments. Worse still, the EMU has systemically caused destabilizing macroeconomic imbalances that member states found difficult or impossible to counteract with their remaining policy instruments. And even though the international financial crisis had its origins beyond Europe, the EMU has greatly increased the vulnerability of some member states to its repercussions. Its effects have undermined the economic and fiscal viability of some EMU member states and have frustrated political demands and expectations to an extent that may yet transform the economic crisis into a crisis of democratic legitimacy. Moreover, present efforts by EMU governments to "rescue the euro" will do little to correct the economic imbalances and vulnerabilities, but are likely to deepen economic problems and political alienation in both the rescued and the rescuing polities.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSHo... |
| Additional Information: | © 2011 The Author |
| Divisions: | European Institute |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) J Political Science > JZ International relations |
| JEL classification: | G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Oct 2013 07:18 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Sep 2023 23:25 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/53448 |
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