Rabinowicz, Wlodek (2009) Incommensurability and vagueness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 83 (1). pp. 71-94. ISSN 0309-7013
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Identification Number: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2009.00173.x
Abstract
This paper casts doubts on John Broome's view that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability in value. It shows how vagueness can be imposed on a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the ‘fitting attitudes’ analysis of value.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(IS... |
| Additional Information: | © 2009 Wiley |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Oct 2013 09:28 |
| Last Modified: | 29 Oct 2024 22:15 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/53258 |
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