Employment duration and shifts into retirement in the EU

Aranki, Ted and Macchiarelli, Corrado (2013) Employment duration and shifts into retirement in the EU. LSE 'Europe in Question' discussion paper series (58/2013). London School of Economics and Political Science, London.

Preview

PDF Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

According to Principal-Agent theory, states (the principal) delegate the implementation of a legalized agreement to an international organization (the agent). The conventional wisdom about states’ capacity to control international organizations is that differences among the member states impede control and consequently enhance the agent’s autonomy, whereas agreement allows for effective control and limited autonomy. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, this article argues that conflicts among states need not impede effective control. On the contrary: it harbors gains from the exchange of informal control over an organization’s divisions. As a result, international organizations exhibit informal spheres of influence, or national chiefdoms. The article demonstrated the theory’s plausibility using the example of the EU. It has implications for the literature on delegation and informal governance.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSHo...
Additional Information:	© 2013 The Authors
Divisions:	European Institute
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C4 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics > C41 - Duration Analysis J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J14 - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Time Allocation, Work Behavior, and Employment Determination and Creation; Human Capital; Retirement > J26 - Retirement; Retirement Policies
Date Deposited:	27 Sep 2013 11:39
Last Modified:	15 Sep 2023 23:29
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/53190

Actions (login required)

View Item