Prat, Andrea (2000) An economic analysis of campaign finance. World Economics, 1 (2). pp. 13-27. ISSN 1468-1838
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Electoral campaign finance is an important, and much debated, phenomenon in democracies throughout the world. This article discusses a possible economic model of campaign finance, which could be used for policy evaluation. At the core of the model lies an asymmetry of information between lobbies and voters. Lobbies know more than voters about the quality of candidates. Campaign contributions constitute an indirect way to reveal lobbies’ information to voters. However, this informational benefit comes at the cost of candidates deviating from the median voter’s preferred policy in order to attract higher contributions.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.world-economics-journal.com |
| Additional Information: | © 2000 NTC Publications Ltd |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Jun 2008 14:23 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 21:19 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5249 |
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