Besley, Timothy and Prat, Andrea (2005) Credible pensions. Fiscal Studies, 26 (1). pp. 119-135. ISSN 1475-5890
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Identification Number: 10.1111/j.1475-5890.2005.00006.x
Abstract
One of the main problems in pension policy is to develop an institutional framework that guarantees that public and private pensions promises are kept. This paper discusses how the governance of public and private pensions is key to making such promises credible. It argues that credibility concerns undermine the case for earnings-related pensions run by the state and private defined benefit plans.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0143-5671 |
| Additional Information: | © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Inc |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Jun 2008 14:08 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Jan 2024 06:27 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5247 |
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