Martin, Mathieu and Salles, Maurice (2013) Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions. International Game Theory Review, 15 (3). ISSN 0219-1989
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Identification Number: 10.1142/S0219198913400124
Abstract
We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the nonemptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are 'ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.worldscientific.com/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2013 World Scientific Publishing Company |
| Divisions: | CPNSS |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Aug 2013 11:47 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2024 00:25 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/51783 |
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