Fleurbaey, Marc and Maniquet, F. (2007) Fair social orderings. Economic Theory, 34 (1). pp. 25-45. ISSN 0938-2259
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Identification Number: 10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4
Abstract
In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://link.springer.com/journal/199 |
| Additional Information: | © 2006 Springer-Verlag |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Aug 2013 13:44 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Jan 2024 22:03 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/51473 |
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