Williamson on inexact knowledge

Mahtani, Anna ORCID: 0000-0003-1581-4325 (2008) Williamson on inexact knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 139 (2). pp. 171-180. ISSN 0031-8116

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s11098-007-9109-9

Abstract

Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through. The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://link.springer.com/journal/11098
Additional Information:	© 2007 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	02 Oct 2013 10:58
Last Modified:	03 Apr 2024 02:18
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/50727

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