Levy, Gilat 
ORCID: 0009-0006-7641-1668
(2007)
Decision–making procedures for committees of careerist experts.
American Economic Review, 97 (2).
pp. 306-310.
ISSN 0002-8282
Abstract
The article focuses on the effect of transparency of committees on committee member voting. Proponents of transparency emphasize the benefits of enhanced accountability and predictability, as well as the provision of expert information to the economy. Political scientists and economists both note that transparency can yield inefficient decisions as decision makers start hiding their private views in public. This would distort the process of information aggregation. The article also states that committee members would vote depending on the popular sentiment concerning the decision, rather than what they feel is right or wrong.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.aeaweb.org/aer |
| Additional Information: | © 2007 American Economic Association |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Date Deposited: | 12 May 2008 11:20 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 23:14 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4817 |
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