Steele, Katie Siobhan (2012) The scientist qua policy advisor makes value judgments. Philosophy of Science, 79 (5). pp. 893-904. ISSN 0031-8248
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Richard Rudner famously argues that the communication of scientific advice to policy makers involves ethical value judgments. His argument has, however, been rightly criticized. This article revives Rudner’s conclusion, by strengthening both his lines of argument: we generalize his initial assumption regarding the form in which scientists must communicate their results and complete his ‘backup’ argument by appealing to the difference between private and public decisions. Our conclusion that science advisors must, for deep-seated pragmatic reasons, make value judgments is further bolstered by reflections on how the scientific contribution to policy is far less straightforward than the Rudner-style model suggests.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://philsci.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 Philosophy of Science Association |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) Q Science > Q Science (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Mar 2013 10:17 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2024 00:13 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/47683 |
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