Volckart, Oliver 
ORCID: 0000-0001-7330-111X
(2009)
Regeln, Willkür und der gute Ruf: Geldpolitik und Finanzmarkteffizienz in Deutschland, 14. bis 16. Jahrhundert.
Jahrbuch fur Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 2009 (2).
pp. 101-130.
ISSN 0075-2800
Abstract
This paper examines the questions of whether and how feudal rulers were able to credibly commit to monetary stability, and of which consequences their decisions had for the efficiency of financial markets. The study reveals that princes were usually only able to commit to issuing a stable coinage in gold, but not in silver. As for silver currencies, the hypothesis is that transferring the right of coinage to an autonomous city was the functional equivalent of establishing an independent central bank. An analysis of market performance indicates that financial markets between cities that were autonomous with regard to monetary policies were significantly better integrated and more efficient than markets between cities whose currencies were supplied by a feudal ruler.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/jwg/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2009 Akademie Verlag |
| Divisions: | Economic History |
| Subjects: | D History General and Old World > DD Germany H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions |
| JEL classification: | G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G15 - International Financial Markets N - Economic History > N1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Growth and Fluctuations > N13 - Europe: Pre-1913 N - Economic History > N2 - Financial Markets and Institutions > N23 - Europe: Pre-1913 N - Economic History > N4 - Government, War, Law, and Regulation > N43 - Europe: Pre-1913 |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Sep 2012 09:35 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Nov 2024 05:19 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/45657 |
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