Gledhill, James (2012) Rawls and realism. Social Theory and Practice, 38 (1). pp. 55-82. ISSN 0037-802X
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Political realists like Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss reject political moralism, where ideal ethical theory comes first, then applied principles, and politics is reduced to a kind of applied ethics. While the models of political moralism that Williams criticizes are endorsed by G.A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin respectively, I argue that this realist case against John Rawls cannot be sustained. In explicating and defending Rawls’s realistically utopian conception of ideal theory I defend a Kantian conception of theory where it is by abstracting from immediate realities that theory is fit to guide practice by providing a framework for political judgment.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://stp.philosophy.fsu.edu/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 Florida State University |
| Divisions: | Government |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics J Political Science > JC Political theory |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Mar 2012 12:36 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Sep 2023 14:25 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/41899 |
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