Ferreira, Daniel, Manso, Gustavo and Silva, Andre (2014) Incentives to innovate and the decision to go public or private. Review of Financial Studies, 27 (1). pp. 256-300. ISSN 0893-9454
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We model the impact of public and private ownership structures on firms' incentives to invest in innovative projects. We show that it is optimal to go public when exploiting existing ideas and optimal to go private when exploring new ideas. This result derives from the fact that private firms are less transparent to outside investors than are public firms. In private firms, insiders can time the market by choosing an early exit strategy if they receive bad news. This option makes insiders more tolerant of failures and thus more inclined to invest in innovative projects. In contrast, the prices of publicly traded securities react quickly to good news, providing insiders with incentives to choose conventional projects and cash in early.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Finance |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| JEL classification: | G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Rating Agencies G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development > O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D |
| Date Deposited: | 24 Sep 2012 10:20 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Apr 2024 03:51 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/37365 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
