Dessein, Wouter, Garicano, Luis and Gertner, Robert (2010) Organizing for synergies. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2 (4). pp. 77-114. ISSN 1945-7669
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Large companies are usually organized into business units, yet some activities are almost always centralized in a company-wide functional unit. We first show that organizations endogenously create an incentive conflict between functional managers (who desire excessive standardization) and business-unit managers (who desire excessive local adaptation). We then study how the allocation of authority and tasks to functional and business-unit managers interacts with this endogenous incentive conflict. Our analysis generates testable implications for the likely success of mergers and for the organizational structure and incentives inside multidivisional firms.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-micro/index.php |
Additional Information: | © 2010 American Economic Association |
Divisions: | Economics Management Centre for Economic Performance |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries |
Date Deposited: | 29 Jun 2011 09:32 |
Last Modified: | 13 Aug 2024 23:13 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/37001 |
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