Reiss, Julian (2009) Causation in the social sciences: evidence,inference, and purpose. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 39 (1). pp. 20-40. ISSN 0048-3931
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Identification Number: 10.1177/0048393108328150
Abstract
All univocal analyses of causation face counterexamples. An attractive response to this situation is to become a pluralist about causal relationships. “Causal pluralism” is itself, however, a pluralistic notion. In this article, I argue in favor of pluralism about concepts of cause in the social sciences. The article will show that evidence for, inference from, and the purpose of causal claims are very closely linked.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://pos.sagepub.com/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2009 Sage |
| Divisions: | CPNSS |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 08 Jun 2011 10:32 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 22:57 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/36461 |
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