Preventing collusion through discretion

Felli, Leonardo and Hortala-Vallve, R. ORCID: 0000-0002-9677-497X (1996) Preventing collusion through discretion. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

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Abstract

Large public bureaucracies are usually less efficient than modern private corporations. This paper explains how the degree of discretionary power might account for this difference in efficiency. In fact, increasing the discretionary power of the intermediate layers of an organization can enhance productivity by preventing collusion between middle managers and line workers; provided that collusion has a negative effect on the organization's surplus and takes place in conditions of asymmetric information

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 1996 Leonardo Felli
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group STICERD Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Date Deposited:	28 Feb 2008
Last Modified:	15 Nov 2024 09:24
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3597

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