Dietrich, Franz (2004) Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems. Journal of Economic Theory, 26 (2). pp. 286-298. ISSN 1095-7235
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising field of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a specific type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions arguably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore suggest restricting independence to “premises”, which leads to a generalised premise-based procedure. This procedure is proven to be possible if the premises are logically independent.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220... |
| Additional Information: | © 2004 Elsevier |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic |
| Date Deposited: | 03 May 2011 11:38 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 22:48 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/35827 |
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