Common errors of reasoning in child protection work

Munro, Eileen ORCID: 0000-0003-4828-2791 (1999) Common errors of reasoning in child protection work. Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 (8). pp. 745-758. ISSN 0145-2134

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Abstract

Objective: repeated public inquiries into child abuse tragedies in Britain demonstrate the level of public concern about the services designed to protect children. These inquiries identify faults in professionals’ practice but the similarities in their findings indicate that they are having insufficient impact on improving practice. This study is based on the hypothesis that the recurrent errors may be explicable as examples of the typical errors of human reasoning identified by psychological research. Methods: the sample comprised all child abuse inquiry reports published in Britain between 1973 and 1994 (forty-five in total). Using a content analysis and a framework derived from psychological research on reasoning, a study was made of the reasoning of the professionals involved and the findings of the inquiries. Results: it was found that professionals based assessments of risk on a narrow range of evidence. It was biased towards the information readily available to them, overlooking significant data known to other professionals. The range was also biased towards the more memorable data, that is, towards evidence that was vivid, concrete, arousing emotion and either the first or last information received. The evidence was also often faulty, due, in the main, to biased or dishonest reporting or errors in communication. A critical attitude to evidence was found to correlate with whether or not the new information supported the existing view of the family. A major problem was that professionals were slow to revise their judgements despite a mounting body of evidence against them. Conclusions: errors in professional reasoning in child protection work are not random but predictable on the basis of research on how people intuitively simplify reasoning processes in making complex judgements. These errors can be reduced if people are aware of them and strive consciously to avoid them. Aids to reasoning need to be developed that recognise the central role of intuitive reasoning but offer methods for checking intuitive judgements more rigorously and systematically.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.elsevier.com/locate/chiabuneg
Additional Information:	Published 1999 © Elsevier Science Inc. Articles available via LSE Research Articles Online are protected under intellectual property law, including copyright law. Any use made of the contents should comply with the relevant law.
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Date Deposited:	11 Aug 2005
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 22:10
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/358

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