Land distribution, incentives and the choice of production techniques in Nicaragua

Bandiera, Oriana ORCID: 0009-0002-6817-793X (2002) Land distribution, incentives and the choice of production techniques in Nicaragua. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

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Abstract

Does the distribution of land rights affect the choice of contractible techniques? I present evidence suggesting that Nicaraguan farmers are more likely to grow effort-intensive crops on owned rather than on rented plots. I consider two theoretical arguments that illustrate why property rights might matter. In the first the farmer is subject to limited liability; in the second the owner cannot commit to output-contingent contracts. In both cases choices might be inefficient regardless of land distribution. The efficiency loss, however, is lower when the farmer owns the land. Further evidence suggests that, in this context, the inefficiency derives from lack of commitment.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2002 The author.
Divisions:	STICERD Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD100 Land Use
JEL classification:	O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q1 - Agriculture > Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation
Date Deposited:	28 Feb 2008
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2024 04:51
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3545

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