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Decentralized corruption or corrupt decentralization? Community monitoring of poverty-alleviation schemes in Eastern India

Véron, René, Williams, Glyn, Corbridge, Stuart and Srivastava, Manoj (2006) Decentralized corruption or corrupt decentralization? Community monitoring of poverty-alleviation schemes in Eastern India. World Development, 34 (11). pp. 1922-1941. ISSN 0305-750X

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.024

Abstract

Democratic decentralization and community participation often stand at the center of an agenda of “good governance” that aims to reduce corruption and increase the state’s accountability to its citizens. However, this paper suggests based on empirical studies on the Employment Assurance Scheme in rural West Bengal that the strength of upward accountability (especially to political parties) is as crucial as downward accountability to communities. When these vertical accountabilities are weak, horizontal accountability structures between local civil society and officials can mutate into networks of corruption in which “community” actors become accomplices or primary agents.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03057...
Additional Information: © 2006 Elsevier Ltd.
Divisions: International Development
Geography & Environment
Asia Centre
Subjects: D History General and Old World > DS Asia
H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
J Political Science > JQ Political institutions Asia
Date Deposited: 26 Feb 2008
Last Modified: 21 Apr 2024 17:33
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3488

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