Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen and Kopczuk, Wojciech (2011) Transfer program complexity and the take-up of social benefits. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3 (1). pp. 54-90. ISSN 1945-7731
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We model complexity in social programs as a by-product of the screening process. While a more rigorous screening process may improve targeting efficiency, the associated complexity is costly to applicants and induces incomplete take-up. We integrate the study of take-up with the study of rejection (Type I) and award (Type II) errors, and characterize optimal programs when policy makers choose screening intensity (and complexity), an eligibility rule, and a benefit level. Consistent with many real-world programs, optimal programs feature high complexity, incomplete take-up, classification errors of both Type I and II and, in some cases, "excessive" benefits.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-policy/index.php |
| Additional Information: | © 2011 American Economic Association |
| Divisions: | Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Apr 2011 12:44 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Apr 2024 02:30 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/33767 |
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