Decision making and implementation in teams

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi ORCID: 0009-0002-9237-2049 and Möller, Marc (2008) Decision making and implementation in teams. . London School of Economics and Political Science.

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Abstract

We study a team whose members choose a joint project and exert individual efforts to implement it. Members have private information about the productivities of alternative projects. We find conditions under which information fails to be shared and the most productive project fails to be selected. While the concealment of information can be efficient, the team's incentive to conceal is inefficiently strong. Information sharing can be improved through delegation of authority and by the use of contracts. We derive the sharing rule and team size that maximize the likelihood with which the team selects the most productive project.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:	http://personal.lse.ac.uk/blanesiv/teams.pdf
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L29 - Other
Date Deposited:	26 Jan 2011 15:06
Last Modified:	19 Apr 2024 12:42
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/31684

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