Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi ORCID: 0009-0002-9237-2049 (2007) Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse. Economics Letters, 94 (2). pp. 163-169. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

I show that delegating decision rights to subordinates increases their career concern incentives by making their performance more transparent and alleviating the winner's curse in the labour market.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio...
Additional Information:	© 2006 Elsevier
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Date Deposited:	21 Jan 2011 17:03
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 22:17
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/31523

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