Blanes i Vidal, Jordi (2007) Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse. Economics Letters, 94 (2). pp. 163-169. ISSN 0165-1765
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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.024
Abstract
I show that delegating decision rights to subordinates increases their career concern incentives by making their performance more transparent and alleviating the winner's curse in the labour market.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio... |
| Additional Information: | © 2006 Elsevier |
| Divisions: | LSE |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Jan 2011 17:03 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Jan 2024 20:54 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/31523 |
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