Dietrich, Franz and Spiekermann, Kai 
ORCID: 0000-0003-4983-5589
(2010)
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises.
Working papers.
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Abstract
The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the ‘wisdom of crowds’. But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises - voter independence - is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility for the theorem’s misleading conclusion that ‘large crowds are infallible’. We prove a more useful jury theorem: under defensible premises, ‘large crowds are fallible but better than small groups’. This theorem rehabilitates the importance of deliberation and education, which appear inessential in the classical jury framework.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www2.lse.ac.uk/CPNSS/Home.aspx |
| Additional Information: | © 2010 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Government |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Dec 2010 13:15 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 20:15 |
| Projects: | The LSE Choice Group |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/30677 |
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