Dizadji-Bahmani, Foad, Frigg, Roman 
ORCID: 0000-0003-0812-0907 and Hartmann, Stephan
(2010)
Confirmation and reduction: a Bayesian account.
Synthese, 179 (2).
pp. 321-328.
ISSN 0039-7857
Abstract
Various scientific theories stand in a reductive relation to each other. In a recent article, we have argued that a generalized version of the Nagel-Schaffner model (GNS) is the right account of this relation. In this article, we present a Bayesian analysis of how GNS impacts on confirmation. We formalize the relation between the reducing and the reduced theory before and after the reduction using Bayesian networks, and thereby show that, post-reduction, the two theories are confirmatory of each other. We then ask when a purported reduction should be accepted on epistemic grounds. To do so, we compare the prior and posterior probabilities of the conjunction of both theories before and after the reduction and ask how well each is confirmed by the available evidence.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.springer.com/philosophy/epistemology+an... |
| Additional Information: | © 2010 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) Q Science > Q Science (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Nov 2010 16:35 |
| Last Modified: | 03 Apr 2024 17:30 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/29988 |
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