Directed search with multiple job applications

Galenianos, Manolis and Kircher, Philipp (2009) Directed search with multiple job applications. Journal of Economic Theory, 144 (2). pp. 445-471. ISSN 1095-7235

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Abstract

We develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor market where workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs. Our main theoretical contribution is to integrate the portfolio choice problem faced by workers into an equilibrium framework. All equilibria of our model exhibit wage dispersion. Consistent with stylized facts, the density of wages is decreasing and higher wage firms receive more applications per vacancy. Unlike most models of directed search, the equilibria are not constrained efficient.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio...
Additional Information:	Copyright © 2008 Elsevier B.V.
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies > J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Date Deposited:	20 Oct 2010 08:31
Last Modified:	12 Apr 2024 17:30
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/29702

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