Machover, Moshé (2010) Penrose’s square-root rule and the EU Council of Ministers: significance of the quota. In: Cichocki, Marek A. and Zyczkowski, Karol, (eds.) Institutional Design and Voting Power in the European Union. Ashgate Dartmouth, Surrey, UK, pp. 35-42. ISBN 9780754677543
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
In a two-tier decision-making system such as the EU Council of Ministers, if the number of constituencies (member-states) is sufficiently large (say, 15 or more), Penrose’s Square-Root rule can be implemented to a high level of approximation by a simple weighted decision rule at the top level (the Council) with any given quota q smaller than the total weight. This leaves one degree of freedom: the value of q as a free parameter, to be determined by some additional condition. I propose to survey and discuss critically the most important considerations for fixing this value – some of which have actually been used by theoreticians or practitioners: efficiency, transparency, sensitivity (total voting power of citizens), mean majority deficit, giving certain ‘privileged’ coalitions blocking status. Some of these considerations are reasonably compatible; others less so. Some kind of compromise is clearly needed. But which? This is essentially a political matter; but a political decision ought to be made in a theoretically enlightened way.
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.ashgate.com/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2010 The author |
| Divisions: | CPNSS |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Sep 2010 10:41 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 17:24 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/29478 |
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