Dietrich, Franz and Mongin, Philippe (2010) The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation. Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (2). pp. 562-582. ISSN 1095-7235
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Abstract
In the framework of judgment aggregation, we assume that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and that both Independence (formula-wise aggregation) and Unanimity Preservation hold for them. Whether premiss-based aggregation thus defined is compatible with conclusion-based aggregation, as defined by Unanimity Preservation on the non-premisses, depends on how the premisses are logically connected, both among themselves and with other formulas. We state necessary and sufficient conditions under which the combination of both approaches leads to dictatorship (resp. oligarchy), either just on the premisses or on the whole agenda. Our analysis is inspired by the doctrinal paradox of legal theory and is arguably relevant to this field as well as political science and political economy. When the set of premisses coincides with the whole agenda, a limiting case of our assumptions, we obtain several existing results in judgment aggregation theory.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220... |
Additional Information: | © 2010 Elsevier B.V. |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
Date Deposited: | 08 May 2010 12:48 |
Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 22:47 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/27896 |
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