Spiekermann, Kai ORCID: 0000-0003-4983-5589 (2008) Reply: clubbish justice. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 7 (4). pp. 447-453. ISSN 1470-594X
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Replying to my earlier article `Translucency, Assortation, and Information Pooling: How Groups Solve Social Dilemmas', Robert Goodin examines the normative implications of the rule `cooperate with those whose inclusion benefits the larger scheme of cooperation', and gives several reasons for why the conversion of justice into a club good is normatively unappealing. This reply to Goodin discusses whether the rule leads to an exclusion of poor agents, whether a group should hire agents to detect free-riders, and how a group should deal with naive cooperators. The rule can be defended as an enforcement mechanism in some cases, but it is normatively unappealing as a theory of justice.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://ppe.sagepub.com/ |
Additional Information: | © 2008 SAGE Publications |
Divisions: | Government |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2010 16:45 |
Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 23:20 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/26738 |
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