Dewan, Torun and Myatt, David P. (2007) Scandal, protection, and recovery in the cabinet. American Political Science Review, 101 (1). pp. 63-77. ISSN 1537-5943
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that a prime minister benefits from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals.We explore a model in which scandals are positively related to policy activism, so that a prime minister may wish to protect a minister from resignation calls. We find that protection can sometimes discourage activism: it enhances the value of a minister’s career and hence encourages him to “sit tight” by moderating his activities. On the other hand, an exogenous increase in exposure to scandals may lead a minister to “live for today” by pursuing controversial policies. The primeminister’s ability to protect ministers is limited by her short-term incentive to fire. She may, however, enhance her credibility by building a collective reputation with the cabinet; the heterogeneity of cabinet membership plays an important role.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJourna... |
| Additional Information: | © 2007 American Political Science Association |
| Divisions: | Government |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Dec 2009 11:44 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Apr 2024 01:21 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/26408 |
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