Information and rationality asymmetries in a simple high-low search wage model

Reyniers, Diane J. ORCID: 0000-0003-0677-2020 (1992) Information and rationality asymmetries in a simple high-low search wage model. Economics Letters, 38 (4). pp. 479-486. ISSN 0165-1765

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Identification Number: 10.1016/0165-1765(92)90037-Y

Abstract

A simple model of wage bargaining is developed. The firm knows the worker's productivity but the worker has only probabilistic information about his value to the firm. The worker acquires information by making wage demands and observing the resulting hiring/firing decisions of the firm. The firm acts strategically and distorts the worker's learning process.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio...
Additional Information:	© 1992 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Divisions:	Management
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited:	02 Dec 2009 10:10
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 20:59
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/25990

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