Garicano, Luis and Santos, Tano (2004) Referrals. American Economic Review, 94 (3). pp. 499-525. ISSN 0002-8282
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This paper studies the matching of opportunities with talent when costly diagnosis confers an informational advantage to the agent undertaking it. When this agent is underqualified, adverse selection prevents efficient referrals through fixed-price contracts. Spot-market contracts that rely on income sharing can match opportunities with talent but induce a team-production problem which, if severe enough, can prevent the referral of valuable opportunities. Partnership contracts, in which agents agree in advance to the allocation of opportunities and of the revenues they generate, support referrals where the market cannot, but often at the expense of distortions on those opportunities that are not referred.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.aeaweb.org/aer |
| Additional Information: | © 2009 American Economic Association |
| Divisions: | Management Centre for Economic Performance |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Nov 2009 16:24 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 22:47 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/25575 |
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