Burkart, Mike 
ORCID: 0000-0002-0954-4499, Gromb, Denis and Panunzi, Fausto
(2005)
Minority blocks and takeover premia.
Financial Markets Group Discussion (544).
Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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Abstract
This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or retain their shares. As private benefit extraction is inefficient, the post-takeover share value increases with the bidder’s shareholdings. In a successful takeover, the blockholder tenders all his shares and the small shareholders tender the amount needed such that the post-takeover share value matches the bid price. Compared to a fully dispersed target company, the bidder may have to offer a higher price either to win the blockholder’s support or to attract enough shares from small shareholders.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://fmg.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 2005 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Financial Markets Group |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Jul 2009 10:07 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Apr 2024 07:56 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/24663 |
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