Competition and incentives with motivated agents

Besley, Timothy ORCID: 0000-0002-8923-6372 and Ghatak, Maitreesh ORCID: 0000-0002-0126-0897 (2003) Competition and incentives with motivated agents. Theoretical Economics; TE/2003/465 (TE/03/465). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

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Abstract

A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private non-profits is the importance of missions, as opposed to profit, as an organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. This paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphazises the role of matching principals' and agents' mission preferences in increasing organizational efficiency. Matching economizes on the need for high-powered incentives. However, it can also entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations. The framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition, incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits, and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for-profit sector and the mission-oriented sector through occupational choice.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2003 by the authors
Divisions:	Economics STICERD
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
JEL classification:	L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L31 - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises; Privatization; Contracting Out
Date Deposited:	27 Apr 2007
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2024 04:51
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/2202

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