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Competition and incentives with motivated agents

Besley, Timothy and Ghatak, Maitreesh ORCID: 0000-0002-0126-0897 (2004) Competition and incentives with motivated agents. CEPR discussion paper no. 4641. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London.

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Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4641.asp
Divisions: STICERD
Economics
Centre for Analysis of Risk & Regulation
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited: 27 Apr 2007
Last Modified: 01 Apr 2024 07:56
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/2201

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