Leahy, D. and Neary, J. P. (1995) Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries. CEPDP (270). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This paper examines the free-market and socially optimal outcomes in a dynamic oligopoly model with R&D spillovers. First-best optimal subsidies to R&D are higher when firms play strategically against each other but lower when they cooperate on R&D (at least with high spillovers) and when they play strategically against the government. Second-best optimal subsidies to R&D are presumptively higher than first-best ones, but policies to encourage cooperation are likely to be redundant (since it is always privately profitable) and simulations suggest that the welfare cost of lax competition is high.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://cep.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 1995 the authors |
| Divisions: | Centre for Economic Performance |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Aug 2008 15:18 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 19:35 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/20692 |
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