Judgment aggregation with consistency alone

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X (2007) Judgment aggregation with consistency alone. . Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. (Submitted)

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Abstract

All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation require individ- ual and collective judgment sets to be consistent and complete (in some recent results with completeness relaxed to deductive closure), arguably a demand- ing rationality requirement. They do not carry over to aggregation functions mapping pro…les of (merely) consistent individual judgment sets to (merely) consistent collective ones. We prove that, whenever the agenda of propositions under consideration exhibits mild interconnections, any such aggregation func- tion that is "neutral" between the acceptance and rejection of each proposition is dictatorial. We relate this theorem to the literature.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:	http://personal.lse.ac.uk/list/default.htm
Additional Information:	© 2007 Franz Dietrich and Christian List
Divisions:	Government Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	29 Jul 2008 14:14
Last Modified:	15 Sep 2023 23:08
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/20110

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