List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X
(2001)
Epistemic democracy : generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem.
Journal of Political Philosophy, 9 (3).
pp. 277-306.
ISSN 0963-8016
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Abstract
This item was published as 'Appendix 3: An Implication of the k-option Condorcet jury mechanism for the probability of cycles' in List and Goodin (2001) http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/705/. Standard results suggest that the probability of cycles should increase as the number of options increases and also as the number of individuals increases. These results are, however, premised on a so-called "impartial culture" assumption: any logically possible preference ordering is assumed to be as likely to be held by an individual as any other. The present chapter shows, in the three-option case, that given suitably systematic, however slight, deviations from an impartial culture situation, the probability of a cycle converges either to zero (more typically) or to one (less typically) as the number of individuals increases.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/JOPP |
Additional Information: | © 2001 Blackwell Publishing |
Divisions: | Government Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS |
Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
Date Deposited: | 28 Jul 2008 09:05 |
Last Modified: | 11 Aug 2024 22:51 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/19991 |
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