Epistemic democracy : generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem

List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X (2001) Epistemic democracy : generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem. Journal of Political Philosophy, 9 (3). pp. 277-306. ISSN 0963-8016

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Abstract

This item was published as 'Appendix 3: An Implication of the k-option Condorcet jury mechanism for the probability of cycles' in List and Goodin (2001) http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/705/. Standard results suggest that the probability of cycles should increase as the number of options increases and also as the number of individuals increases. These results are, however, premised on a so-called "impartial culture" assumption: any logically possible preference ordering is assumed to be as likely to be held by an individual as any other. The present chapter shows, in the three-option case, that given suitably systematic, however slight, deviations from an impartial culture situation, the probability of a cycle converges either to zero (more typically) or to one (less typically) as the number of individuals increases.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/JOPP
Additional Information:	© 2001 Blackwell Publishing
Divisions:	Government Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS
Subjects:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Date Deposited:	28 Jul 2008 09:05
Last Modified:	10 Apr 2024 23:10
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/19991

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