Self-confidence and survival

Bar-Isaac, Heski (2001) Self-confidence and survival. TE (428). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

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Abstract

We consider the impact of history on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods, whose quality is learned slowly. If the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers, a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling. When she knows her quality, a good seller never stops selling. Furthermore, a seller with positive, though imperfect, information sells for the same number of periods whether her information is private or public. We further consider the robustness of the central result when the seller's opportunities for strategic behaviour are limited.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 2001 Heski Bar-Isaac
Divisions:	STICERD
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
JEL classification:	L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D42 - Monopoly D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming > C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Date Deposited:	11 Jul 2008 14:38
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 18:29
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/19329

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