Berlinski, Samuel, Dewan, Torun and Dowding, Keith (2007) Individual and collective performance and the tenure of British ministers 1945-1997. PEPP (25). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.
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Abstract
We study the effects of individual and collective ministerial performance on the length of time a minister serves in British government from 1945-97, using the number of resignation calls for a minister as an individual performance indicator and the cumulative number of such calls as an indicator of government performance. Our analysis lends support to a ‘two-strike rule’: ministers facing a second call for their resignation have a significantly higher hazard than those facing their first, irrespective of the performance of the government. A minister’s hazard rate is decreasing in the cumulative number of resignation calls; but conditional on receiving a first resignation call, the hazard rate increases with the number of calls that all government ministers have faced in the past. Our message is that collective ministerial performance is a key determinant of whether a minister survives his first resignation call.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 2007 the authors |
| Divisions: | Government STICERD Public Policy Group |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JC Political theory |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Jul 2008 16:26 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 20:02 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/19281 |
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